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Abstract. In this article I propose a new problem for the classical analysis of 
knowledge (as justified true belief) and all analyses belonging to its legacy. The gist 
of my argument is that truth as a condition for a belief to be knowledge is 
problematic insofar there is no definition of truth. From this, and other remarks 
relating to the possibility of defining truth (or lack thereof) and about what truth 
theories fit our thoughts about knowledge, I conclude that as long as truth is 
unquestioningly taken as a condition of knowing, knowledge can never be 
defined in a way that could satisfy our intuitions about it.  
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I. Introduction 
 
In his article, Gettier discusses the classical analysis of knowledge 
as having the general form: 
 
“S knows that P IFF (i.e. if and only if) 
(i)  P is true, 
(ii)  S believes that P, and 
(iii) S is justified in believing that P.” 
(Gettier 1963) 
 
This general form is supposed to be equivalent to most other 
attempts to define knowledge in his day – he offers, as examples, 
Chisholm’s (1957) and Ayer’s (1956) analyses. Gettier shows that if 
condition (iii) is taken as equivalent to “S has adequate evidence 
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for P” and “S has the right to be sure that P” (of the two authors, 
respectively), then there are cases that, by the definition, would be 
knowledge, but nobody would call it knowledge. They would be 
cases in which the concept would be too large compared to our 
intuitions about its extension. The similarity between the three 
conditions is necessary for Gettier’s critique, for he bases his 
argument on the concept of justification, the most flexible part of 
the classical definition.  
The “flexibility” of the justification condition is used by 
Zagzebski (1994) to show how Gettier’s examples take away the 
possibility of any definition of knowledge of the form x + true belief 
(where x is a placeholder for justification, Plantinga’s (1993) 
warrant, or other conditions that replace justification) or of the 
form justified true belief + x (where x is any condition added to the 
classical analysis, like Clark’s (1963) full grounding, or some 
defeasibility condition)1. The most important conclusion is that “no 
account of knowledge as true belief plus something else can 
withstand Gettier objections as long as there is a small degree of 
independence between truth and the other conditions of 
knowledge” (Zagzebski 1994, p.72). 
In my paper I wish to show that the analysis of knowledge 
as justified true belief is flawed in yet another way – the condition 
of the truth of the belief to be known. It is to be noted here that 
truth seems to be an essential condition in all analyses of 
knowledge – all the authors cited as building definitions of 
knowledge take it for granted. My point will be a rather 
pragmatical one, but I hope to show that trying to define 
knowledge based on the classical analysis is a kind of jumping the 
gun, precisely because truth isn’t investigated enough in the 
context. Moreover, I arrive at the conclusion that knowledge can 
not (and it should not be tried to) be satisfactorily defined while 
keeping the truth condition.  
                                                 
1  Other analyses of knowledge that can be attacked by Zagzebski’s arguments 
are, for example, Sosa’s (1964) objective justifiability, or Goldman’s (1967) 
causal connection. 
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A methodological remark: the scope of my investigation will 
be limited to the context of natural language. This choice is due to 
the fact that the majority of discussions on the topic have been 
carried out in the same context. At the same time, some of the 
“instruments” I will be using might be (and legitimately so) 
considered outdated or not applicable when talking about 
scientific or mathematical knowledge. But they remain useful 
when talking about our everyday language.  
 
 
II. Pseudo-Statements and -Concepts 
 
The first thing to be briefly discussed is the concept of a pseudo-statement, 
as it appears in Carnap’s (1932) “Elimination of Metaphysics” – those 
statements that seem to have meaning, but are actually meaningless. 
This lack of meaning is due to the presence of pseudo-concepts in 
the expression, terms that have no meaning. 
The meaning Carnap talks about is the set of criteria of 
application (Carnap 1932, p. 63) of the term to stuff in the world. A 
concept is meaningful insofar as we can say about things that they 
fall under the concept or not, using the criteria of application. 
Generally, if we would talk about definitions, we would say that 
the definiens has to offer us criteria for using the definiendum; the 
definiens must teach us how to use a concept as a name for a thing.  
Again, one might feel that this analysis of meaning and 
language is in some way outdated. What I want to take away from 
it is the intuitive principle that for a word to be in any way useful, 
or important, or even meaningful, it must be usable; and, of 
course, we must be able to use it such that we can make ourselves 
understood. Another two elements of Carnap’s discussion will be 
useful as well, and maybe even more easily accepted: if a word has 
no criterion of application, it cannot be used; and if two words have 
the same criteria of application, they are synonymous (v. “teavy” 
and “toovy”, op. cit. p. 64).  
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III. Correspondence 
 
In its classical version, correspondence is the conception that truth 
is the correspondence of a proposition and facts, or between 
thoughts and reality etc. A couple of well-known formulations of 
the theory appear in Aristotle (Metaph., 1011b25)2 and d’Aquino 
(Summa Th., I, Q.16, A.2, Resp)3.  
This version of the correspondence theory of truth has a 
problem, that of the undecidability of what is true and what is not. 
Suppose that in a soundproof and windowless room there are 
some people. Someone comes in and utters the sentence “There is 
a green meteorite fallen in the middle of the street” – how would 
the room-dwellers decide if what the new person said was true?  
A naive supporter of the correspondence theory would say 
that all that has to be done is for the people to go outside and 
check if there is a green meteorite in the street. Say there really is 
one, and the people compare the proposition they heard with the 
fact – there is a correspondence, so the proposition is true.  
The problem here is that the comparison doesn’t happen 
between the proposition and the fact, but rather between the 
proposition and new propositions formed by the people 
themselves. It could be said that the source of this objection is the 
in principle impossibility of getting to the kantian thing-in-itself (in 
another form, the problem is shown by Kant (1992, pp. 557-558) 
and also, later, by Russell (2004, pp. 79-80)). This problem is the 
reason for the emergence and evolution of many modern theories 
of truth, such as coherence and pragmatism.4  
As such, going back to the previous section, one could say 
the correspondence theory of truth does not offer any criteria of 
                                                 
2  “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to 
say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”  
3  “A judgment is said to be true when it conforms to the external reality” or, 
the latin “Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus” 
4  Of course, this objection is easily by-passed by holding a hard, direct 
realist view, but it can be said that this kind of view is quite unpopular 
among philosophers from as early as Plato.  
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application for truth. Truth, as it is shown by the correspondence 
theorists, is a pseudo-concept – expressions of the form “p is true” 
are pseudo-statements, because the conception doesn’t tell us when 
and how to use them.  
 
 
IV. Doing Away with Correspondence 
 
The fact that truth is a pseudo-concept, at least with an underlying 
correspondence view about it, means that knowledge as true belief 
plus something else is a pseudo-concept too. We cannot apply the 
term knowledge to anything as long as the conjunction that is the 
definiens contains a pseudo-concept.  
An attempt to give a criterion of application for truth was 
using the coherence theory as a helping instrument.5 Truth would 
remain the correspondence between propositions and facts, but 
true propositions would be those that are coherent with the set of 
propositions already known to be true. There are two problems 
here: besides the well-known one of which propositions are the 
ones known to be true, a problem arises in that the correspondence 
theory becomes completely useless. The fact that truth would be 
correspondence is obsolete for the new definition – it offers no 
criteria of application, the criterion being given by the coherence test. 
It adds nothing to the meaning of truth. As such, again considering 
Carnap’s discussion of “teavy” and “toovy”, we are driven to abandon 
correspondence as having anything to bring to the table.  
Being left with a criterion of application but no underlying 
conception of truth, we may be tempted to extend coherence to 
account for the conception part too. It would be said that truth is 
coherence. But more and more problems rise up; the previously-
mentioned problem of which truths are to be taken as “basic”; the 
fact that the laws of the excluded middle and of non-contradiction 
can’t be put under the coherence test (Russell 2004, p. 80); and the 
                                                 
5  This way of dealing with the problem seems to be discussed by Russel 
(2004, ch. 12) but he quickly reverts to correspondence. 
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possibility of there being a set of sentences with which both a 
sentence p and its negation are coherent (as is the case of ZFC and 
the Continuum Hypothesis; v. Woodin 2001).  
So, I shall conclude, coherence is not a viable option either. 
Should we, in the footsteps of Russell, return to some form of 
correspondence? The answer I propose is negative. The reasons for 
this answer are the following: Firstly, it is highly implausible that 
any convincing form of correspondence will ever surpass the main 
objection, that of the impossibility of getting to the facts or things 
themselves. Secondly, and this will lead me to the next section, it is 
doubtful whether we will ever have a satisfying definition of truth, 
whatever its underlying conception would be – Tarski’s result 
(1956, §1) concerning natural languages, those with which we are 
concerned too, indicates this.  
 
 
V. Knowledge without Truth? 
 
To further the discussion I will comment on a couple of objections 
that could be brought to my analysis. Firstly, one could say that it 
is dubious that I considered only two perspectives on truth and I 
claim that the critique can be extended to all others. Secondly, it 
can be said that it is irrelevant, in the context of defining 
knowledge, that we have no definition of truth yet, because we 
intuitively know pretty well what the extensions of “truth” and 
“knowledge” are.  
The reason for my considering only the correspondence and 
coherence theories of truth is that the problem of criteria of 
application is best shown in the context of the two. The 
conclusions regarding them can be easily extended – it is not hard 
to check what criteria (if any) a theory offers for the application of 
the term “true” as its definiens. Moreover, I will shortly argue that 
the attack on correspondence is the only relevant one, being the 
only fitting theory for a definition of knowledge.  
Regarding the second objection: what it presupposes is that, 
firstly, there is a definition of truth that hasn’t been yet discovered 
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and which could be inserted as an underlying conception in the 
definition of knowledge; and, secondly, that at least theoretically 
we can get to that definition. Both points are debatable. Imagine a 
group of workers who have just finished building a roof – but 
independently of some other group of workers, who are building 
the house on which the roof is to be put. The problem here is that 
the first group of workers don’t have the certainty that the roof will 
fit on the house, or even that the house will ever be finished. We 
cannot know in advance that we will get to a satisfying definition 
of truth, on which to base the definition of knowledge; what is 
more, it doesn’t seem that a correspondence-type definition of 
truth will ever be attained. As good a definition of knowledge we 
may get, it must rest on the definition of truth and it is useless 
without the latter. In short, the various analyses of knowledge are 
jumping the gun.  
Why would a correspondence theory of truth be the only 
fitting one for a definition of knowledge? Both science and the 
common man, in their daily lives, have the (more or less 
conscious) pretence that when they know something, they know 
something about the world. Claims of science can be considered to 
be about the objects and stuff in the world or about the structure of 
the world, depending on the philosophical position. We think that 
propositions like “the glass is on the table” are also, even though 
naively so, about the world. We say that we have knowledge about 
the world – about what else could we have it, after all? We want for 
what we think to be matching what is; a kind of correspondence 
theory comes with our human nature, evidence for this being the 
fact that our oldest intuitions (philosophical or otherwise) about 
truth have lead us to the correspondence theory, and they are 
more or less the same intuitions guiding us today in the pursuit of 
truth. It is hard to think that we could speak about knowledge 
without relating it to the world, and as hard to think knowledge 
without correspondence. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
As such, it seems that knowledge cannot be defined in a way that 
would fit our intuitions as long as truth remains undefined; also, 
the view on the possibility of defining truth (also keeping in tone 
with out intuitions) is pessimistic to say the least.  
A final remark: as my results are entirely negative, something 
must be said about what remains to be done. Seeing, as I hope to 
have shown, that knowledge and truth, as they are normally 
conceived, cannot be reconciled, or even really talked about, I 
suggest that these analyses be shifted into more “unorthodox” 
territory – for example, virtue epistemology, or Williamson’s 
(2002) ‘knowledge-first’ approach etc. For many of the recent 
approaches to truth and knowledge most of the problems I have 
talked about don’t even appear. Or, maybe when we are tired of 
all of it, we can turn to some kind of deflationism, or some 
epistemic anti-realism.  
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